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Abstract
Objectives Numerous papers have measured hospital
efficiency, mainly using a technique known as data
envelopment analysis (DEA). A shortcoming of this tech-
nique is that the number of outputs for each hospital gen-
erally outstrips the number of hospitals. In this paper, we
propose an alternative approach, involving the use of
explicit weights to combine diverse outputs into a single
index, thereby avoiding the need for DEA.
Methods Hospital productivity is measured as the ratio of
outputs to inputs. Outputs capture quantity and quality of
care for hospital patients; inputs include staff, equipment,
and capital resources applied to patient care. Ordinary least
squares regression is used to analyse why output and pro-
ductivity varies between hospitals. We assess whether
results are sensitive to consideration of quality.
Results Hospital productivity varies substantially across
hospitals but is highly correlated year on year. Allowing for
quality has little impact on relative productivity. We find
that productivity is lower in hospitals with greater financial
autonomy, and where a large proportion of income derives
from education, research and development, and training
activities. Hospitals treating greater proportions of children
or elderly patients also tend to be less productive.
Conclusions We have set out a means of assessing hos-
pital productivity that captures their multiple outputs and
inputs. We find substantial variation in productivity among
English hospitals, suggesting scope for productivity
improvement.
Keywords Hospital sector  Productivity  Production
functions  DEA
JEL Classification C21  C43  D24  I11  I18
Introduction
Numerous articles have appeared over the years purporting
to measure differences in hospital efficiency, the majority
of which apply a technique known as data envelopment
analysis (DEA) [1]. Few have had any practical influence,
either on policy makers or hospital management [2, 3].
This lack of impact stems largely from concerns about the
robustness of the technique and the limited insights it offers
about what action to take [4].
Data envelopment analysis has proved popular among
academics because it can accommodate analysis of
multiple outputs and inputs. It does this by applying
linear programming to search for a set of organisation-
specific weights with which to combine diverse outputs
into a single function (and the same for inputs). How-
ever, DEA can only handle multiple outputs up to a point
determined by the number of organisations under con-
sideration [5]. As Newhouse noted, the problem with
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applying this technique to the hospital sector is that the
number of outputs produced by each hospital usually
outstrips the number of hospitals under consideration [6].
Newhouse had in mind each output being described as a
diagnosis related group (DRG), of which there were
some 500 at that time of writing. There are few countries
with this many hospitals. One ‘‘solution’’ by proponents
of DEA has been to describe hospital outputs much more
crudely, as the numbers of inpatients, day-cases or out-
patients [7–9]. This fails to recognise the substantial
heterogeneity among patients within these categories,
thereby immediately undermining the exercise: results
may simply reflect analytical failure to take proper
account of the true nature of production.
In this paper we propose an alternative approach to
dealing with the multiple output problem. This involves
imposing an explicit set of weights with which to combine
diverse outputs into a single index, thereby obviating the
need for DEA. Our approach is an extension of the national
accounting framework, developed to measure changes in
health care productivity at national level. Our interest here
is in measuring relative productivity among hospitals, and
we develop cross-sectionally equivalent specifications of
national output and input indices. We set out these speci-
fications in the ‘‘Methods’’ section. We then apply these
methods to the English hospital sector, describing our data
in the ‘‘Data’’ section. Results are reported in the ‘‘Results’’
section. The last section concludes.
Methods
In this paper we pursue two main objectives. First, we
construct measures of productivity for each NHS hospital.
To this end we follow the approach adopted in the con-
struction of the national productivity index detailed in
Dawson et al. [10] and Castelli et al. [11]. We construct
these measures for the financial years 2008/09 and
2009/10. Second, we analyse why productivity varies from
one hospital to another by specifying econometric models
in which productivity is regressed against a variety of
variables that capture characteristics of each hospital. As
sensitivity analyses, we estimate Cobb–Douglas production
functions with output as the dependent variable and we
assess the impact of accounting for quality when measuring
hospital output.
Hospital productivity
Productivity is measured by comparing the total amount of
health care ‘output’ produced to the total amount of ‘input’
used to produce this output (see Eq. 1). Output consists of
all healthcare provided to patients (both in inpatient and
outpatient settings) by hospital h (h = 1…H) and inputs
include the staff, intermediate, and capital resources that
contribute to the production of healthcare for these patients.
Productivity of hospital h ¼ Outputsh
Inputsh
ð1Þ
To ease interpretation and comparison of productivity
across hospitals, for each year we construct a measure of
















where Xh is the volume of output produced and Zh the
amount of input used in hospital h. The standardised pro-
ductivity of each hospital is given by dividing the hospital
specific output/input ratio by the national average output/
input ratio, standardising around 1 and expressing this as a
percentage difference. Thus, if standardised productivity in
hospital h is 10, this means that productivity in that hospital
is 10 % higher than the national average.
Measuring hospital outputs
Hospital output consists primarily of the number of patients
treated. Patients have diverse health care needs and the
nature of the care received differs markedly from one
patient to the next. We take this diversity into account by
classifying inpatients into one of 1,400 healthcare resource
groups (HRGs), the English equivalent of DRGs, and
outpatient attendances into 1,498 categories [12].
Healthcare resource groups and the outpatient groups
form the building blocks of activity-based funding in
England by which hospitals are paid a prospective price for
each patient treated in each output category [13]. The HRG
prices are based on the national average cost reported
3 years previously for all patients categorised to the HRG
in question [14]. Consistent with this payment policy, we
use national average costs as a set of weights to distinguish
patients categorised to different HRGs and outpatient
groups and to aggregate the total number of patients treated
by each hospital into an overall measure of hospital output.
Thus, ‘cost-weighted’ hospital output Xh





where xjh represents the number of patients categorised to
output category j with j = 1…J in hospital h. The cost
weight is defined as cj ¼ cj=c^ where cj represents the
1 We are grateful to one of the referees for guidance in arriving at this
formulation.
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national average cost for patients allocated to output j and c^
is the national average cost across all patients.
Of course, it is not enough that hospitals treat patients,
they should also treat them well. However, evidence sug-
gests considerable variability across hospitals in the quality
of care that patients experience [15–18]. The quality of
treatment can be recognised in the measure of output, such
that a hospital that delivers superior quality to its patients is
deemed to have produced a greater amount of output. A






where the quality adjustment is identified by the term
qjh ¼ qjh=q^j. Here qjh is the quality of care experienced by
patients allocated to output j in hospital h and q^j captures
the national average quality of output j. Our adjustment is
designed to reflect the quality-adjusted life years (QALYs)
associated with treatment and adapts the form used to
account for quality in the English national accounts [10]:
qjh ¼
ajh  kjdajh  kj

















Direct QALY estimates for each HRG are unavailable.
Instead, we construct the equivalent of a QALY profile for
patients allocated to each HRG [19]. A survival measure
(ajh) captures the probability of survival for people in each
HRG. We multiply this probability by life expectancy
(LEjh) and a measure of change in health status following
treatment (kj) to arrive at an estimate of the total amount of
QALYs experienced by this group of survivors over their
remaining lifetime. Those who do not survive treatment are
afforded a zero QALY gain. Waiting for treatment (wjh)
yields disutility, and we express this disutility in terms of
QALYs by valuing days spent waiting in the same metric
as we value remaining life expectancy. This allows us to
subtract the disutility associated with waiting from the
QALY gains associated with treatment in order to arrive at
our estimate of net QALY gain for each HRG.
Survival (ajh) is measured as the 30-day post discharge
survival rates for each output in each hospital. The change
in health status (kj) is measured as the ratio of average
health status (h0) before and after (h*) treatment, such that
kj ¼ h0j
.
hj . In the absence of HRG-specific information we
assume that, on average, the ratio for elective patients is
twice that for non-elective patients [20]. Life expectancy
(LEjh) associated with each HRG is calculated by
considering the age and gender profiles of patients allo-
cated to each HRG. The inverse exponential function
reflects decreasing life expectancy over time and rQ is the
discount rate applied to future life years.
Waiting times (wjh) for each HRG in each hospital are
measured at the 80th percentile of the distribution for
patients categorised to each HRG. Our formulation implies
that delays to treatment have adverse health consequences
and that the marginal disutility of waiting increases as the
delay increases, with the disutility captured as an expo-
nential function and by the discount rate rw [10].
Measuring hospital inputs
The provision of hospital treatment involves utilising a
variety of different inputs during the production process.
These inputs include labour, capital and intermediate
inputs. Capital is defined as any non-labour input with an
asset life of more than a year, such as land and buildings.
Intermediate inputs comprise all other non-labour inputs,
such as drugs and dressings, disposable supplies and
equipment, and use of utilities.
Information about the physical quantities of these inputs
is hard to come by, but comprehensive details are available
about how much hospitals spend on each type of input.
Total expenditure can be broken down as follows:
Z
0
h ¼ ELh þ EAh þ EKh þ EMh ; ð6Þ
where Zh
0
is an aggregation of expenditure on NHS labour
(Eh
L), agency staff (Eh
A), capital (Eh
K) and intermediate inputs
(Eh
M).
Hospital expenditure is the product of the volume and
price of its inputs. Prices of labour, buildings and land may
vary across English hospitals according to their geo-
graphical location. In order to remove these exogenous
price effects, we apply the sub-indices of the Department
of Health’s Market Forces Factor (MFF) to expenditure on
labour (hh
L) and capital (hh
K) inputs [21]. Intermediate inputs
are not considered to be subject to similar exogenous
geographical influences and hence no adjustment is made
for them.
Our measure of total hospital input, then, is calculated
as:
Zh ¼ hLhðELh þ EAh Þ þ hKh EKh þ EMh ð7Þ
Productivity indices
In summary, we construct two standardised productivity
measures for each hospital. Our preferred measure of total
factor productivity, set out as Eq. (2), uses Eq. (4) to
construct the output index and Eq. (7) for the input index.
We also construct a productivity measure which does not
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account for quality. This involves replacing the output

















Examining variations in hospital productivity
We examine variations in hospital productivity by esti-
mating ordinary least squares (OLSs) regressions with
robust standard errors to account for potential heterosced-
asticity. Our dependent variables are the two standardised
productivity measures described in Eqs. (2) and (8) i.e.
yh = {Ph, Ph
C}. We regress these against a number of
explanatory variables (g ¼ 1; . . .; G) that have been iden-
tified in the literature as exerting an influence over per-
formance at hospital level. The OLS regression model is
given by:
yh ¼ b0 þ
X10
g¼1
bgHospvarsgh þ eh: ð9Þ
We test the relationship between productivity and the
proportion of each hospital’s patients that received some
form of specialised care (Spec). These patients were
identified using the approach described in Daidone and
Street [22]. The effect of specialisation on hospital pro-
ductivity is hard to determine. In theory, hospitals that offer
a wide range of hospital services might benefit from
economies of scope, in that the joint production of outputs
yields cost savings [23]. However, specialist hospitals
might be more productive because resources are ear-
marked for specific functions rather than being subject to
competing use and because specialisation promotes the
development of expertise (Harris [24], Kjekshus and Hagen
[25] and Street et al. [26, 27]).
Public NHS hospitals can be divided into Foundation
Trusts (FTs) and non-Foundation Trusts (NFTs). FTs were
introduced in the English NHS in 2004/05, as not-for-profit
public organisations which enjoy a greater managerial and
financial autonomy from direct central government control
[28]. FTs can retain surpluses (to re-invest in capital
equipment and/or to increase salaries) and can borrow
money to invest in improved services for patients and
service users [29]. Moreover, FTs have a new form of
governance designed to create a greater engagement of the
local community, patients and staff in running their activ-
ities. The expectation is that these incentives would allow
FTs to deliver ‘‘high productivity, greater innovation and
greater job satisfaction’’ [30, 31].
Teaching hospitals might incur higher costs and appear
less productive than non-teaching hospitals because they
tend to treat more complex or more severe patients.
Moreover, teaching might introduce delays to the treatment
process, as consultants tend to spend more time when
assessing a patient in order to train medical students [32].
In many studies, hospitals are classified simply as teaching
hospitals or not. Here, rather than using a dummy for
teaching status, we identify teaching activities as a con-
tinuous variable, measuring income received by hospitals
for education, research and development, and training as a
proportion of total income (Education_p).
Hospitals that care for a large proportion of patients
admitted as emergencies may find it more challenging to
optimise utilisation of their facilities [33, 34]. Hence, we
control for the proportion of emergency admissions over
total admissions (Emerg_p).
Healthcare resource groups (HRGs) do not capture
perfectly differences in care requirements among patients.
Recognising this, we consider some variables capturing
patient case-mix. These include the percentage of female
patients (Female_p) and the percentage of patients falling
into three age categories: aged 0–15 years (Age_015_p),
aged 46–60 years (Age_4660_p) and over 60 years
(Age_60_p), with patients aged 16–45 years (Age_1645_p)
forming the reference category.
We consider two variables that capture efficiency in
resource use. These are the proportion of occupied beds
over total beds (Occuppc) and the average length of stay,
which is calculated as the ratio of total inpatient days over
total number of patients (LoS).
Examining variations in hospital outputs
Hospital productivity specified as a ratio imposes an
implicit assumption of constant returns to scale. This
assumption may not hold so, as a sensitivity analysis, we
estimate a standard Cobb–Douglas production function to
examine variations in the log of hospital output (both cost
and quality adjusted).
With three factors of production a Cobb–Douglas pro-
duction function can be specified as:
lnYh ¼ lnSh þ c1ln hLh ELh þ EAh
 	
 þ c2ln hKh EKh 	
þ c3lnEMh þ eh; ð10Þ
where c1; c2 and c3 are parameters describing the contri-
butions to output made by labour, capital and intermediate
inputs, respectively. It is assumed that the parameters c1; c2
and c3 are the same for all hospitals, with differences
amongst hospitals being captured by the error term eh. The
logarithmic form enables us to interpret coefficients as
elasticities: for example, a 1 % increase in the amount of
total labour employed is predicted to lead to a percentage
increase in output equal to the value c1. Further, Sh can be
thought of in terms of a ‘‘shift’’ parameter comprising the
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explanatory variables discussed in the section ‘‘Examining
variations in hospital productivity’’.
We estimate two separate equations. In the first, we
assume that only the three factors of production influence
hospital outputs; in the second, we also include the control
variables (hospvars) from the section ‘‘Examining varia-
tions in hospital productivity’’.
Data
We construct a range of variables about (1) hospital inpa-
tient activity using data extracted from the hospital episode
statistics (HES) database [35] and (2) outpatient atten-
dances from the reference cost database [36, 37]. The HES
database comprises more than 15 million patient records
per financial year, with each record reported as a finished
consultant episode (FCEs). An FCE measures the time a
patient spends under the care of a particular consultant. The
majority (around 88 %) of patients remain under the care
of the same consultant for the whole duration of their
hospital stay; however, a small proportion is cared for by
more than one consultant because they are transferred from
one specialty to another. By combining the episodes of care
received by each individual patient, we construct a ‘‘pro-
vider spell’’ for each patient, capturing their entire hospital
stay.
To construct our measures of quality, we merge date of
death data collated by the Office of National Statistics and
life expectancy tables [38] to patients in the HES database.
This allows us to capture deaths occurring within 30 days
from discharge and to construct age and gender-specific
measures of life expectancy. Waiting times and length of
stay are calculated directly from HES. Each FCE is asso-
ciated with an HRG; we allocate patients with multiple
episodes to the HRG recorded in their first FCE.
We assign a cost to each FCE in HES and to each
outpatient attendance using the national average unit costs
reported in the reference cost data. The cost of a spell is
calculated on the basis of the most expensive FCE within
the spell [11]. We then calculate the national average cost
of a patient spell for each HRG. These national averages
form the set of cost weights cj by which to aggregate
patients in different HRGs and outpatient categories into a
single index of output.
Information about the inputs used in the production of
hospital activity is taken from the hospital financial
accounts. These detail expenditure on NHS and agency
staff by broad categories of labour input, such as medical
and nursing staff, technical and clerical staff, and man-
agers. Intermediate inputs include drugs and gases,
clinical supplies, catering, hotel services, laundry, bed-
ding, energy, establishment and premises costs. Two
forms of information are reported about capital expen-
diture: current outlays on equipment and depreciation on
assets. We make assumptions according to the asset in
question about what proportion of current expenditure is
employed in the current period [39]. As mentioned, we
adjust reported costs for labour, buildings and land using
the MFF.
Tables 1 and 2 provide summary statistics about hos-
pital inpatient and outpatient activity and about inputs for
Table 1 Summary statistics for
NHS outputs and inputs,
2008/09
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max
Hospital outputs
Elective and day cases
Number of patients 169 48,326 34,218 3,416 200,977
Mean 30-day post discharge survival rate 169 0.99 0.00 0.97 1.00
Mean life expectancy in years 169 24 7 15 63
80th percentile waiting times (days) 168 72 63 16 750
Non-electives
Number of patients 169 41,135 22,921 203 127,522
Mean 30-day post discharge survival rate 169 0.95 0.02 0.83 1.00
Mean life expectancy in years 169 34 7 17 65
Outpatient
Volume of activity 169 388,465 208,270 31,075 1,044,235
Hospital inputs (£000)
NHS labour 169 150,652 92,185 10,184 548,360
Agency labour 169 6,171 5,882 0 44,887
Intermediate goods and services 169 55,899 42,887 6,553 234,753
Capital 169 19,028 15,130 269 115,739
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the years 2008/09 and 2009/10, respectively. Note that five
of the hospitals that appear in 2008/09 were merged into
two hospitals in 2009/10.2 Table 3 reports descriptive sta-
tistics of each explanatory variable used in the regression
analysis, including its source.3
Results
Hospital productivity
Productivity ratios and ranks for each hospital are provided
in the accompanying spreadsheet (see online supporting
material). Our preferred ranking is based on the measure of
total factor productivity where we account for quality of
hospital care (Eq. 2). Allowing for quality, output is scaled
up by an average of 0.46 % in 2008/09 and by 0.37 % in
2009/10, these adjustments being of a similar magnitude to
those in the national accounts [11]. But there is wide var-
iation among hospitals in the impact of this adjustment,
ranging from more than -6 % at the 5th percentile to more
than 10 % at the 95th percentile.
The main points of note are the following:
• We find a substantial variation in hospital productivity,
ranging from ?45 % above to -62 % below the
national average in 2008/09 and from ?33 % above to
-57 % below the national average in 2009/10.
• The position of individual hospitals does not vary
greatly from one year to the next. The correlation
between the hospital rankings across the two years is
high at r = 0.87.
• Productivity scores are not particularly sensitive to
whether or not we account for quality. The correlation
between the hospital rankings from Ph and from Ph
C is
high at r = 0.92 and r = 0.93, respectively in 2008/09
and 2009/10.
• The Mid Essex Hospital Services NHS Trust emerges
as the most productive hospital in 2008/09 and is third
most productive in 2009/10.
• At the other end of the spectrum, the same four
hospitals have the lowest productivity each year. Three
of these are specialist cancer hospitals (The Royal
Marsden NHS Foundation Trust, The Christie NHS
Foundation Trust, Clatterbridge Centre for Oncology
NHS Foundation Trust) and the other is the specialist
Royal National Hospital for Rheumatic Diseases NHS
Foundation Trust.
• Consider the hospitals that merged. In 2008/09, Queen
Elizabeth Hospital NHS Trust was ranked 106/169,
Bromley Hospitals NHS Trust 2/169 and Queen Mary’s
Sidcup NHS Trust 73/169. The merged hospital (South
London Healthcare NHS Trust) was ranked 14/166 in
2009/10. Overall, year-on-year output increased by
7.8 % and input by 7.2 %.
Table 2 Summary statistics for
NHS outputs and inputs,
2009/10
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max
Hospital outputs
Elective and day cases
Number of Patients 166 49,183 34,235 3,344 200,917
Mean 30-day post discharge survival rate 166 0.99 0.00 0.97 1.00
Mean life expectancy in years 166 24 7 16 63
80th percentile waiting times (days) 165 80 88 16 889
Non-electives
Number of patients 166 43,050 24,326 201 133,463
Mean 30-day post discharge survival rate 166 0.95 0.02 0.83 1.00
Mean life expectancy in years 166 34 7 18 65
Outpatient
Volume of activity 166 427,168 231,608 33,495 1,125,545
Hospital inputs (£000)
NHS labour 166 164,152 98,377 10,030 567,131
Agency labour 166 7,830 6,766 0 47,241
Intermediate goods and services 166 60,907 46,145 6,664 261,787
Capital 166 20,705 14,670 380 84,818
2 The following mergers took place in 2009/10. Queen Elizabeth
Hospital NHS Trust (RG2), Bromley Hospitals NHS Trust (RG3) and
Queen Mary’s Sidcup NHS Trust (RGZ) merged to become South
London Healthcare NHS Trust (RYQ), while Worthing and South-
lands Hospitals NHS Trust (RPL) and Royal West Sussex NHS Trust
(RPR) merged to form Western Sussex Hospitals NHS Trust (RYR).
3 For one hospital, the Lewisham Hospital NHS Trust, all values for
waiting times are missing.
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• Similarly, in 2008/09 Worthing and Southlands Hospi-
tals NHS Trust was ranked 75/169 and Royal West
Sussex NHS Trust 26/169, while the merged hospital
Western Sussex Hospitals NHS Trust was ranked
21/166 in 2009/10. Output increased by 10.7 % and
input by 8.8 %.
Figure 1 plots our measure of total factor productivity in
2009/10 based on Eq. 2 for (a) all NHS acute hospitals, (b) by
whether or not the hospital is considered specialist and (c) split
by FT status. All three graphs show the four outliers with
substantially lower productivity than the others, these being
The Royal Marsden NHS Foundation Trust, Royal National
Hospital for Rheumatic Diseases NHS Foundation Trust, The
Christie NHS Foundation Trust, and the Clatterbridge Centre
for Oncology NHS Foundation Trust. Graph (b) confirms that
specialist hospitals are subject to the widest variation in
productivity, suggesting that the ‘specialist’ label is being
used to describe a very heterogeneous group of hospitals.
Graph (c) shows that FTs tend to have lower productivity than
non-FTs, even if we ignore the four hospitals at the bottom of
the distribution (which are both specialist hospitals and FTs).
Variation in hospital productivity
Table 4 presents the results of the OLS regression analysis
applied to Eq. (9) for each year. Results for a number of
variables are qualitatively consistent across models and
between years. First, we find no statistically significant
relation between productivity and the proportion of each
hospital’s patients that received some form of specialised
care, perhaps unsurprisingly given the heterogeneity
among specialist hospitals observed in graph (b). Second,
FTs tend to be significantly less productive than non-FTs.
The difference is driven by the higher expenditure on
capital inputs by FTs than by non-FTs—this significance
disappears if we consider labour productivity rather than
total factor productivity. This implies that FTs are using
their borrowing freedoms to invest in their infrastructure
but that this investment has not yet yielded a proportionate
increase in output. Third, productivity decreases signifi-
cantly with the proportion of income spent on education,
training, and research activities. Finally, hospitals that treat
high proportions of both younger (\15) and older ([46)
patients tend to have lower productivity than those treating
a greater proportion of those in the reference age category
(16–45).
Productivity does not appear to be related to the pro-
portion of emergency activity. A negative association is
found between the proportion of female patients and pro-
ductivity measured using Ph; but when the Ph
C index is
used, this significance disappears.
The significance of those variables that capture effi-
ciency in resource use varies from one year to the next. We
find that higher rates of occupied beds are associated with
higher productivity scores in 2008/09 but that this variable
is less statistically significant in 2009/10. Longer average
length of stay is sometimes found to be associated with
lower productivity, but this relation is only highly signifi-
cant (p \ 0.01) when productivity is measured using Ph in
2008/09.
Table 3 Descriptive statistics and variable definitions, 2008/09 and 2009/10
Variables Description Source 2008/09 2009/10
Obs Mean SD Obs Mean SD
Spec Percentage of patients receiving specialised care DH 169 9.69 11.39 166 10.42 12.16
Specialist_only 1 if trust is a specialist trust without FT status, 0
otherwise
DH 169 0.04 0.20 166 0.02 0.15
FT_only 1 if trust is a non-specialist trust with FT status, 0
otherwise
DH 169 0.41 0.49 166 0.44 0.50
Specialist_FT 1 if trust is a specialist trust with FT status, 0 otherwise DH 169 0.08 0.27 166 0.10 0.30
Education_p Income from education, training and research as
proportion of total income
Derived from DH and
Monitor
169 5.25 2.9 166 5.21 2.85
Emerg_p Proportion of emergency patients Derived from HES 169 33.1 10.54 166 33.26 10.57
Female_p Proportion of female patients Derived from HES 169 56.08 5.61 166 55.89 5.58
Age_015p Proportion of patients under 15 years of age Derived from HES 169 14.26 13.67 166 14.06 13.7
Age_1645p Proportion of patients between 16 and 45 years of age Derived from HES 169 29.51 7.94 166 29.12 7.84
Age_4660p Proportion of patients between 46 and 60 years of age Derived from HES 169 16.79 4.63 166 16.76 4.57
Age_over60p Proportion of patients over 60 years of age Derived from HES 169 39.44 10.4 166 40.06 10.61
LoS Total inpatient days/total inpatient patients Derived from HES 169 2.91 0.64 166 2.84 0.64
Occuppc Occupancy rate DH 169 84.96 6.28 166 84.75 6.41
DH Department of Health, HES Hospital Episode Statistics
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Variation in hospital outputs
Table 5 presents the results of our regression analysis
applied to Eq. (10) for both years. Results are consistent for
both measures of our dependent variable and across the
two years. The coefficients of labour and capital are posi-
tive and statistically significant. This implies that labour
and capital have a positive association with output, whether
or not quality is accounted for. The coefficient for inter-
mediate input is never significant. We find that the sum of
the estimated coefficients for labour (c1), capital (c2) and
intermediate (c3) inputs is roughly equal to 0.99 in both
years, which suggests that the assumption of constant
returns to scale is realistic.
Most of the other explanatory variables have a negative
impact on output in both years. The exceptions are the
proportion of specialised care where the negative influence
is modest in magnitude and statistically significant only in
2009/10; the occupancy rate which has a significant posi-
tive influence (although only weakly so in 2009/10); and
LoS which is generally not highly significant, except in
explaining quality-adjusted output in 2009/10.
Conclusions
The voluminous literature that applies DEA to the hospital
sector has had virtually no impact on policy, probably
largely because the intended audience lacks confidence in
the analytical approach and, hence, the reliability of the
results [3]. However, the fundamental policy questions
remain: what productivity variation pervades the hospital
sector and what are the opportunities for productivity
improvement? In this paper we have attempted to address
these questions by going back to basics, as advocated by
some commentators [40].
Our approach has been to draw on the growth
accounting literature used to measure changes in produc-
tivity growth over time at national or sectoral level and
apply this to a cross-sectional context where interest lies in
comparing productivity differences across organisations
within a sector, this being the focus of many DEA studies.
Growth indices use weights in the base (Laspeyres index)
or current (Paasche index) period. Instead, here we apply
weights that reflect the national average for the year in
question. Of course, it would be straightforward to extend
our formulation to calculate differential productivity
growth for each hospital by using as weights the national
average costs in the base (Laspeyres) or current (Paasche)
period or the geometric mean of the two (Fisher).
Just as in DEA, we define productivity as the ratio of
outputs to inputs. However, unlike in DEA, we are explicit
about what weight to attach to each type of output so that
these can be combined into a single index. In contrast,
DEA weights are usually allowed to vary freely, with the
maximisation function designed to evaluate each organi-
sation in the best possible light. This might be desirable in
some contexts, notably where (1) organisations are free to
pursue whatever objectives they choose and (2) where the




































































































Fig. 1 Standardised total factor quality adjusted productivity in
2009/10 for: a all NHS acute hospitals, b non-specialist versus
specialist and c by FT status
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the situation that we evaluate. Hospitals in England, and
most other countries, are tasked to pursue social objectives,
so weights ought to reflect social values [41]. Hospitals
also produce a large and diverse range of outputs. In
England, as in many countries, there are considerably more
outputs than the total number of hospitals, rendering DEA
practically unfeasible.
Rankings of relative productivity are sensitive to the
choice of weights. To illustrate, the correlation in rankings
from our approach and from a DEA model in which inputs
are disaggregated into labour, capital and intermediate
categories amounts to r = 0.84 (2008/09) and r = 0.9
(2009/10). The divergence is due to allowing differential
weights among organisations in how DEA re-aggregates
inputs into a single index. But differential weights are
unnecessary in this study because they are measured in
monetary units that permit natural aggregation.
If weights are available, DEA is unnecessary: the ana-
lytical problem is reduced to construction of a productivity
ratio of an output index over an input index [40]. The
challenge is to find an appropriate set of weights. In this
study, we apply output weights based on observed average
costs. These can be defended on two grounds. First, this
type of weighting is used in the construction of health
productivity measures for the national accounts [42]. Sec-
ond, the prices that hospitals are paid for their activity are
also based on average observed costs [43]. The drawback is
that costs, of course, reflect producer rather than consumer
valuations [44]. In recognition of this, we incorporate
measures of quality into the output index as well. If a
comprehensive set of social values was available, allowing
a social weight to be attached to each output, it would be
straightforward to substitute these for the weights we have
employed. This is not, however, an immediate prospect.
A further complaint about DEA is that it does not allow
for data error, unlike regression analysis or stochastic
frontier analysis (SFA). Of course, it is possible to estimate
an SFA version of the Cobb-Douglas production function




* p \ 0.10; ** p \ 0.05;
*** p \ 0.01
2008/09 2009/10




Spec -0.0000494 -0.0693 -0.0793 -0.0979
(-0.00) (-0.52) (-0.48) (-0.63)
Specialist_only 10.02 16.49** -1.901 6.626
(1.30) (2.36) (-0.18) (0.69)
FT_only -5.828*** -5.363*** -6.630*** -6.252***
(-3.50) (-3.27) (-4.68) (-4.56)
Specialist_FT -15.72** -12.96* -14.00* -12.15*
(-2.01) (-1.88) (-1.78) (-1.70)
Education_p -2.514*** -2.062*** -2.569*** -2.207***
(-5.87) (-5.11) (-6.39) (-5.94)
Emerg_p -0.186 -0.177 -0.161 -0.137
(-1.15) (-1.12) (-0.85) (-0.77)
Age015p -0.779*** -0.831*** -0.697** -0.765***
(-3.02) (-3.41) (-2.42) (-2.91)
Age4660p -1.959*** -1.677*** -1.399* -1.052
(-3.23) (-2.87) (-1.79) (-1.49)
Ageover60p -0.223 -0.637*** -0.242 -0.670***
(-1.06) (-3.45) (-1.14) (-3.74)
Femalep100 -0.390 -0.736** -0.481 -0.810**
(-1.03) (-2.09) (-1.04) (-2.00)
Occuppc_100 0.484*** 0.474*** 0.320* 0.331*
(2.81) (2.87) (1.69) (1.86)
LoS -6.313** -7.034*** -5.571* -6.621**
(-2.41) (-2.89) (-1.83) (-2.47)
Constant 74.49* 106.5*** 82.42 112.1**
(1.94) (3.10) (1.65) (2.54)
N 169 169 166 166
R2 0.591 0.507 0.599 0.513
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in which the SFA ‘‘inefficiency’’ term captures all except the
classically distributed error variance that is not accounted for
in the relationship between inputs and outputs (including those
variables included in our hospvars vector). SFA estimation of
Eq. (10) suggests mean ‘‘inefficiency’’ of around 11–13 %
among hospitals, but only if our hospvars are included. With
the reduced specification no inefficiency term is estimated
because the composite error term is normally distributed.
We believe that errors are unlikely to be substantial in
the datasets we employ. Our measures of output and quality
are constructed from the Hospital Episode Statistics which
is subject to various validation and cleaning processes by the
NHS Information Authority before it is made available for
research purposes. We construct cost weights from cost data
reported by all English hospitals, the same data being used to
calculate the HRG prices according to which hospitals are




















c Xh Xh Xh
c Xh
c Xh Xh
ln (Labour) 0.933*** 0.781*** 0.890*** 0.772*** 0.947*** 0.765*** 0.880*** 0.746***
(8.22) (10.86) (8.47) (11.97) (9.82) (9.27) (9.78) (10.47)
ln (Capital) 0.0848** 0.106*** 0.0648* 0.106*** 0.0878** 0.140*** 0.0700** 0.134***
(2.03) (3.47) (1.78) (3.60) (2.44) (4.79) (2.18) (5.06)
ln
(Intermediate)
-0.0266 0.0822 0.0355 0.0927** -0.0395 0.0667 0.0443 0.0938
(-0.37) (1.58) (0.54) (2.04) (-0.56) (0.91) (0.70) (1.50)
Spec -0.000896 -0.00128 -0.00222 -0.00192
(-0.62) (-1.07) (-1.42) (-1.39)
Specialist_only -0.0495 0.000860 -0.194* -0.110
(-0.53) (0.01) (-1.87) (-1.22)
FT_only -0.0494** -0.0492** -0.0735*** -0.0718***
(-2.00) (-2.09) (-3.69) (-3.92)
Specialist_FT -0.274*** -0.268*** -0.281*** -0.269***
(-2.69) (-2.97) (-2.94) (-3.14)
Education_p -0.0218*** -0.0174*** -0.0205*** -0.0175***






(-3.31) (-3.54) (-2.98) (-2.96)
Age015p -0.0109*** -0.00996*** -
0.00904***
-0.00858***
(-3.90) (-4.09) (-3.14) (-3.27)
Age4660p -0.0268*** -0.0209*** -0.0178** -0.0122*






(-2.96) (-5.24) (-3.06) (-5.51)
Femalep -0.0114*** -0.0137*** -0.0109*** -0.0131***
(-3.07) (-4.20) (-2.74) (-3.86)
Occuppc 0.00636*** 0.00568*** 0.00420* 0.00390*
(3.58) (3.42) (1.91) (1.97)
ln(LoS) -0.0705 -0.105** -0.0867** -0.123***
(-1.40) (-2.53) (-1.99) (-3.40)
Constant 0.00852 1.854*** 0.0481 2.082*** -0.0803 1.864*** -0.0156 2.050***
(0.02) (3.47) (0.12) (4.36) (-0.22) (3.46) (-0.04) (4.24)
N 169 169 169 169 166 166 166 166
R2 0.935 0.970 0.947 0.974 0.944 0.974 0.957 0.978
t-Statistics in parentheses: * p \ 0.10; ** p \ 0.05; *** p \ 0.01
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paid. Costing errors by individual hospitals will have limited
impact because we construct weights based on national
average costs. The measures of input are derived from
expenditure data reported in each hospital’s audited financial
accounts.
Any data errors remaining undetected are unlikely to
explain the substantial variations in productivity that we
have identified across hospitals in England. We find that
hospital productivity varies from ?45 % above to -62 %
below the national average in 2008/09 and from ?33 % to
-57 % in 2009/10. For individual hospitals, relative pro-
ductivity does not vary dramatically year-on-year. Those
organisations that merged between the two years exhibited
increased productivity.
Some of the variation might be explained by the charac-
teristics of hospitals, and we explored this possibility by
estimating regression models with both the productivity ratios
and output indices as dependent variables. We find that, just
as hospitals labelled as ‘specialist’ appear very heterogeneous
in terms of their productivity, the proportion of patients
receiving specialist services does not explain variation in
productivity significantly. Hospitals that have been granted
Foundation Trust status tend to be less productive and have
lower output than non-FTs, which may reflect lags in benefit
realisation following capital investment. Finally, we find
evidence of a negative and significant association between
productivity and the proportion of income from education,
research and development, and training activities.
Our analyses suggest substantial scope for productivity
improvement across the English hospital sector. It would
be worth focusing attention on those hospitals at the top
and bottom of the rankings in order to identify specific
drivers of differential productivity in those organisations.
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